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Although concentrated ownership structure effectively mitigates the traditional 
principal-agent problem, they may lead to conflicts between majority and minority 
shareholders, so-called principal-principal agency conflicts. The introduction of 
ultimate control and multiple large ownership structure definitely aggravates the 
principal-principal agency problem, makes it becomes the focus of corporate 
governance researches. As an important economic link between demand and supply 
parties of audit services, audit fees incorporate lots of interest-related information. 
And thus numbers of scholars made great efforts to study the determinants of audit 
fees, and have accumulated valuable and rich experience in the past 30 years. In the 
late 1990, some scholars began to study on the relationship between corporate 
governance and audit fees. And today, this topic has drawn worldwide attention.  
This study based on the hand-collected data of the voting rights and shareholder 
identities of the top five ultimate large shareholders of 1397 companies listed in 
Shenzhen and Shanghai stock market in 2010. This paper aims to examine how the 
existence (MLS), the number, control contestability and identities of multiple ultimate 
large shareholders (MULS) affect audit pricing. The primary results are as follows. 
First, we found that the influence of existence of multiple ultimate large 
shareholders on audit fees was significantly positive. And the relation between the 
number of MULS and audit fees showed an inverted U-shaped curve. It may indicates 
that when the number of MULS is on the lower level ,other MULS(other than the 
largest ultimate shareholder) would be inclined to resort to external auditor in order to 
curb private benefits. This may result in increase in the demand of high-quality audit 
services and then audit fees. Then, when the number of MULS increased, other 
MULS may think that it’s possible to solve internal problems under their own power. 
So demand for external high-quality audit services decreased and then audit fees. But, 
from a supply party perspective, it may be explained that when the number of MULS 
is small, external auditor’s evaluated audit risk is high. Then it will result in premiums 














Second, we found the control contestability between MULS significantly 
reduced audit fees. That is to say, when the level of control contestability is high, the 
audit fees will be reduced. Additionally, when we controlled the variable represented 
the existence of MULS, the negatively influence became stronger. This may indicate 
the importance of the existence of MULS in the pricing of audit services. 
Third, our findings also showed that when the largest and second large ultimate 
shareholders were under different identities, the audit fees increased. It may suggest 
that the demand for high-quality audit services increases under this circumstance. 
Last but not least, consistent with most other scholars’ related studies, we also 
found that stated-own listed companies’ audit fees significantly higher than 
non-stated-own ones’, which may suggest the inefficiency of stated-own companies’ 
internal governance according to other scholars’ finding. Besides, family-owned 
companies and companies owned by large individuals had lower audit fees according 
to our empirical evidences. But we didn’t find evidence that other types of the largest 
ultimate shareholders would significantly influence audit pricing. 
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